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I  Introduction 
 
In this paper we take a fresh look at an old question: What is the optimal allocation of 
ownership rights? The modern property rights approach, pioneered by Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), argues that in a world of incomplete contracts the 
allocation of ownership rights matters because it assigns residual rights of control. These 
control rights affect the incentives of the involved parties to make relationship specific 
investments that cannot be contracted upon directly. Grossman, Hart and Moore show that 
typically no allocation of ownership rights induces first best investments, but that some 
ownership structures are more efficient than others. Therefore, the involved parties will trade 
ownership rights ex ante in order to set up the second best optimal ownership structure.1 
Another prominent result of this literature (see e.g. Hart, 1995) is that joint ownership is 
rarely optimal. The reason is that if both parties own an asset, then they can prevent each 
other from using the asset which minimizes the threatpoint payoffs of both parties. Giving all 
the ownership rights to one party increases this party’s threatpoint payoff and investment 
incentives without affecting the incentives of the other party.  
In the first part of this paper we report on several experiments on the optimal 
allocation of ownership rights. In the experiments players first have to bargain on the 
allocation of ownership rights on a joint project (a “firm”). They can either have joint 
ownership, or one of the parties can be the sole owner and hire the other party as an 
employee. Then the two parties can make relationship specific investments that increase the 
joint surplus to be generated. Finally the surplus is shared according to the ex ante chosen 
allocation of ownership rights. We are interested in two main questions: First, which 
ownership structure is (second-best) efficient, in the sense that it induces the most efficient 
investment decisions of the two parties? Second, do the experimental subjects understand 
what the most efficient ownership structure is and do they manage to set up this ownership 
structure ex ante? In order to address the second question we consider two different 
experimental designs. In the Joint Ownership Design (JOD) parties start with joint ownership 
but one of the parties can try to sell her ownership stake to the other party. In the A-
                                                 
1 There is an earlier literature on property rights that comes to somewhat different conclusions. Coase (1960) 
emphasizes that it is of crucial importance for economic efficiency that property rights are well defined. 
However, the so called “Coase Theorem” implies that it does not matter for economic efficiency to whom 
ownership rights are allocated. In the absence of any transaction costs any (well defined) allocation of ownership 
rights implements an efficient outcome. Williamson (1985) points out that if the parties can write complete 
contingent contracts, then any ownership structure can be mimicked by an appropriate set of incentive contracts, 
so the allocation of ownership rights is irrelevant. 
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Ownership Design (AOD), A owns the whole project initially, but she can give away half of 
her ownership rights to B. Thus, we can test whether the initial allocation of ownership rights 
affects the final outcome or whether the parties will always manage to set up the efficient 
ownership structure. 
The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership 
structure affects relationship-specific investments and that the large majority of the subjects 
achieve the most efficient ownership allocation starting from different initial conditions. 
However, in contrast to the prediction of the property rights approach, the most efficient 
ownership structure turns out to be joint ownership.  
In the second part of the paper we offer a theoretical interpretation of the experimental 
results. The property rights approach is based on the self-interest model that assumes that all 
parties are only interested in their own material payoffs. However, we know from many 
experiments and also from systematic field evidence2 that concerns for fairness and 
reciprocity play an important role in motivating the behavior of many people. Several 
experiments (e.g. Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997, and Fehr, Klein and Schmidt, 2004) 
point out that if only incomplete contracts can be written, then fairness and reciprocity may 
act as an enforcement device that complements (and sometimes substitutes for) explicit 
incentives that are enforced by the courts.  
In Section III we compare the prediction of the self-interest model to the predictions of 
two other approaches. The first approach assumes that it is common knowledge that all  
parties strongly care about fairness and reciprocity. Models of intention-based reciprocity 
(Rabin, 1993, or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) as well as models of social preferences 
or distributional fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, or Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) predict 
that in this case, the allocation of ownership rights does not matter. Under any allocation of 
ownership rights, fairness and reciprocity suffice as an enforcement device to induce both 
parties to invest efficiently.  
The second approach acknowledges that people differ. Some people seem to care quite 
strongly about fairness and reciprocity while other people seem to be mainly self-interested. 
Furthermore, people often don’t know whether they interact with a fair-minded or a self-
interested opponent. Using the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion, we show that 
in this case, like in Hart (1995), no ownership structure implements first best investments, and 
that the allocation of ownership rights does matter. However, in contrast to Hart (1995), joint 
                                                 
2 See Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for a recent survey on this literature. 
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ownership is predicted to be the most efficient ownership structure. The players anticipate this 
and choose to have joint ownership in equilibrium.   
In the experiments it turned out that no ownership structure can induce both parties to 
invest efficiently. Thus, concerns for fairness and reciprocity did not suffice as an 
enforcement device to achieve the first best. Furthermore, the allocation of ownership rights 
did matter. However, in contrast to the predictions of the self-interest model, joint ownership 
was second-best optimal. The large majority of the experimental subjects anticipated this and 
achieved joint-ownership both in the Joint Ownership Design and in the A-Ownership Design. 
The Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between 
self-interested and fair players is consistent with these observations. 
Our paper is related to several experimental papers on the hold-up problem. Hackett 
(1994) was the first to investigate experimentally the impact of relationship-specific 
investments on ex-post bargaining outcomes. Similar studies include Gantner, Güth and 
Königstein (2001), Königstein and Tietz (2000) and Oosterbeek, Sonnemans and van Velzen 
(2003). All of these papers show that the hold-up problem is mitigated by concerns for 
fairness. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a, b) look at the role of communication and of 
threats and promises to induce efficient investments in a hold-up problem with one-sided 
investments. All of these papers show that concerns for fairness improve investment 
incentives and facilitate coordination. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a, b) apply the Fehr-
Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion to their experiments and show that this model fits 
the data much better than the self-interest model. However, none of these papers considers 
different allocations of ownership rights and how they affect investment incentives.  
There are a few theoretical models showing that joint ownership may sometimes be 
optimal. Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999) consider a set-up where parties have to engage in 
multiple types of investments. They show that joint ownership improves the incentives to 
engage in know-how disclosure which may turn joint ownership to be the optimal ownership 
structure. Maskin and Tirole (1999) consider a buyer-seller relationship and show that joint 
ownership combined with an option to sell his or her share of the asset to the other party can 
implement first best incentives. However, this contract is not collusion-proof. Halonen (2002) 
considers an infinitely repeated game. In the one-shot game, joint ownership is the worst 
ownership structure that minimizes investment incentives.3 However, in the infinitely 
repeated game this ownership structure is desirable, because it provides the strongest 
                                                 
3 See also Hart (2001) for a critical discussion of the repeated games approach to the theory of the firm.  
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punishment possibilities if one of the parties deviates. None of these papers considers the 
effects of fairness and reciprocity that may be generated by joint ownership.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II sets up a simple problem of 
the allocation of ownership rights. Experimental procedures are discussed in Section III. 
Section IV presents the experimental results. In Section V we offer a theoretical analysis of 
the experiment under different assumption about preferences and concerns for fairness. 
Section VI concludes.  
 
II  A Simple Problem of the Allocation of Ownership Rights 
Consider two players, called A and B, who can generate a joint surplus if they have access to 
some set of physical assets (called a “firm”).4 The gross surplus  depends on the 
investments 
( , )v a b
a a≥  and b b≥ , undertaken sequentially by the two players. Investments are 
personally costly with investment costs given by  and , respectively. For 
simplicity, let us assume that the problem is symmetric in the sense that  
and v(a,b) = v(b,a). Suppose that B chooses his investment level first, and that A observes 
B’s investment before she has to invest herself. Let the first best investment levels be denoted 
by   and ,  
( )Ac a ( )Bc b
( ) ( ) ( )A Bc c c⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅
*a *b
  ( *, *) arg max ( , ) arg max ( , ) ( ) ( ),a b S a b v a b c a c b= = − −
and suppose that they are uniquely defined and satisfy *a a>  and *b b> , respectively.  
The investments are assumed to be unobservable by outsiders, so that any investments 
above the minimum investment levels a  and b  cannot be contracted upon. However, at some 
initial date 0, the two parties can write a contract on the allocation of ownership rights on the 
firm and thus on who controls the physical assets that are required for production. If one of 
the parties, say A, is the sole owner of the firm, then she has to hire B at a fixed wage w as an 
employee. In this case monetary payoffs are given by 
 
( , ) ( )
( )
A
B
M v a b w c a
M w c b
= − −
= −  
                                                 
4 The physical assets may be machines, buildings or “soft” assets such as a patent or a client list. We assume that 
the assets have to be owned together, e.g. because there are strong complementarities between them. We do not 
consider the possibility that each of the agents owns a different subsets of assets. See Hart and Moore (1990) for 
a detailed analysis of this case. 
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Clearly, in this case a self-interested B-player will choose b=b  because the marginal return of 
his investment is zero. The A-player, however, is full residual claimant on the margin and will 
invest efficiently (given B’s investment). The case of B-ownership is symmetric. 
If both parties jointly own the firm, then they share the gross returns of the project 
equally and payoffs are  
 
0.5 ( , ) ( )
0.5 ( , ) ( )
A
B
M v a b c a t
M v a b c b t
= − −
= − +  
where  is a potential transfer payment that may be necessary to achieve joint ownership. In 
this case each player gets half of the marginal return of his investment. Thus, under joint 
ownership self-interested players will not invest efficiently either.
t
5 Which of the two 
ownership structures is more efficient depends on the parameters of the surplus and cost 
functions. Note that this is a simplified version of Hart (1995) with investments in physical 
rather than in human assets.6
We chose the following parameterization of this investment problem for our 
experiments. The two parties choose { }, 1,...,10a b∈ . Investments (a,b) yield a gross surplus 
, while investment costs are ( , ) 22 ( )v a b a b= ⋅ + ( ) 12Ac a a=  and . Thus, 
investments are neither complements nor substitutes at the margin, so that optimal investment 
levels are independent of each other. 
( ) 12Bc b b=
Given these parameters of the experiment, the efficient investment levels are given by 
a*=b*=10 which would yield a joint surplus of 200. However, the self-interest model 
predicts that there is no ownership structure that implements efficient investments. With joint 
ownership, each party receives only half of the gross surplus. Thus, the private marginal 
return of the investment is smaller than its marginal cost, so both parties will choose 
minimum investment levels, a=b=1. If one party is the sole owner of the firm, then this party 
receives the full gross surplus on the margin and has an incentive to invest efficiently. The 
                                                 
5 If both players invest simultaneously and if investments are complements at the margin, it is easy to show that 
both players will underinvest (see, e.g. Hart and Moore, 1990, Proposition 1). With sequential investments, 
however, B takes into account that his actual investment level may affect the optimal investment level of A. 
Thus, at this general level it cannot be ruled out that B overinvests (see Noldeke and Schmidt, 1998, Proposition 
1). However, in the parameterization of the experiments that we conducted here there is underinvestment in 
equilibrium under any ownership structure.  
6 If A is the owner of the asset, she gets v(a,b), so she has full access to the returns of B’s investment b, even 
without B’s consent. If the investment was in human capital, A would not be able to realize v(a,b) without B’s 
consent, but she would have to bargain with B in order to bribe him to cooperate. With investments in human 
capital it is never optimal to have joint ownership. With investments in physical capital, joint ownership may be 
optimal. However, in the experiments we restrict attention to the case where joint ownership is not optimal with 
investments in physical capital either.   
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other party, however, receives a fixed wage and will choose the minimum investment level of 
1. Thus, both possible ownership structures are inefficient, but joint ownership is even less 
efficient than A- or B-ownership.  
Before the investments are taken the parties bargain on the allocation of ownership 
rights. The property rights theory (based on the self-interest model) claims that the parties will 
always agree on the most efficient ownership structure (i.e. on A- or B-ownership), no matter 
what the initial allocation of ownership rights is. We consider two different treatments: 
• In the Joint Ownership Design (JOD) both parties jointly own the firm initially. At 
stage 0, A can either choose to stick to joint ownership or she can offer to sell her 
share of the firm to B at price . t
• In the A-Ownership Design (AOD) player A is the single owner of the firm when the 
game starts. At stage 0, A can either choose to remain the sole owner of the firm and 
to hire B as an “employee” at a fixed wage . Alternatively, A can choose to make B 
a co-owner by giving away half of the firm to him.
w
7  
 
Our main questions are, first, whether A-ownership is indeed more efficient than joint 
ownership and, second, whether parties manage to achieve the most efficient ownership 
structure independent of the initial ownership structure.  
 
III Experimental Procedures 
The experiments were conducted at the University of Munich with undergraduate students of 
law, political science, engineering, etc. In total we conducted eight experimental sessions. 
Four sessions (S1–S4) implemented the Joint Ownership Design (JOD), two sessions (S5-S6) 
implemented the A-Ownership Design, and two additional sessions (S7 and S8) implemented 
a control treatment of JOD with the twist that after A’s offer was rejected the game did not 
end but continued with joint ownership (JOD’). In each session we had 20-24 subjects, half of 
them in the role of player A, the other half in the role of player B. The two groups were 
located in separate but adjacent rooms. Before the experiment started, all subjects had to read 
the instructions and to solve several exercises to make sure that all of them understood the 
rules of the experiment. In each session we had ten rounds. In each round an A-player was 
                                                 
7 We did not use the expressions „employee“ and „partner“ in the actual experiments but rather the neutral terms 
“actor A” and “actor B”.  
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matched with a different B-player. Thus, in each experimental session we have for each 
subject ten contracts with ten different anonymous contracting partners.  
After each round the subjects had to compute their own payoff and the payoff of their 
opponent. To rule out the possibility of reputation building, the outcome of each round was 
strictly confidential, that is, each pair of players observed only what happened in their own 
relationship. They did not observe the contracts chosen by or offered to the other subjects in 
the room. Nor did they observe the past behavior of their current partner. Furthermore, the 
matching was random and anonymous. Finally, at the end of the session the subjects collected 
their total monetary payoffs privately and anonymously. Each session lasted for about one and 
a half hours. A complete set of the instructions for all our experiments can be found on our 
webpage.8  
In each session all participants received an initial endowment of € 10.00 (≈US $ 12.50 
at the time of the experiment). The experimental (token) payoffs were exchanged into money 
at the rate of 1 token = € 0.03. Thus, A and B could jointly earn a maximum surplus of € 6 in 
each of the ten rounds. The highest total income of one individual was € 41.00 (≈US $52.00), 
an hourly wage of about € 27.40 (US $34.25). However, the subjects could also make 
substantial losses. In order to avoid the possibility that somebody ends up with negative 
earnings, a subject had to drop out of the experiment if his or her accumulated earnings fell 
below € 1.00, which never happened.  
 
IV Experimental Results 
IV.A Joint Ownership Design 
 
In the Joint Ownership Design (JOD) each party owned 50 percent of the joint venture 
initially. At stage 0 player A could choose either to stick to joint ownership or to sell her 
ownership stake to player B. We conducted four sessions (S1-S4) of this design with a total of 
470 observations.  
 
                                                 
8 The full set of all our experimental instructions, in German and translated into English, are available at 
http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/property_rights/index.htm .  
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Result 1: The large majority of A-players choose to stick to joint ownership. If 
A-players offer to sell their ownership stake to B, these offers got rejected in 
about 30 percent of all cases.  
 
Result 1 is supported by the following figures: In 300 out of 470 cases (63.8 percent) A-
players chose to stick to joint ownership, while there are only 170 cases (36.2 percent) where 
A-players tried to sell their ownership stake to B. If they offered to sell, these offers were 
accepted in 118 cases (69.4 percent) and rejected in 52 cases (30.6 percent). Figure 1 depicts 
the fractions of contractual choices over time and shows that there is no time trend in the data. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
This choice behavior is a clear contradiction of the self-interest model which predicts that B 
ownership should be chosen because it supposedly induces more efficient investment 
behavior. In order to understand this result we have to analyze the actual investment behavior 
of the two players depending on whether joint ownership or B-ownership prevailed.  
Consider first the cases where A-players chose to stick to joint ownership.  Under joint 
ownership 60 percent of all B-players (180 of 300) chose the efficient investment level 10b =  
at stage 1. Only 41 B-players (13.7 percent) chose the minimum investment level b=1. On 
average, B-players invested 7.7. This is in sharp contrast to the prediction of the self-interest 
model that implies that B-players should not invest. 
However, the high investment levels of B-players make sense if we look at the 
reaction of player A at stage 2. Even though it is a dominant strategy for a self-interested 
player A to choose a=1 under joint ownership no matter what investment level has been 
chosen by player B, many A-players reciprocated to high investment levels of player B by 
choosing a high investment level themselves. This is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows the 
average investment level of player A at stage 2 given player B’s investment b at stage 1.9 
Clearly, there is strong reciprocity in A’s investment.  
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
                                                 
9 The average investment level of player A over all cases of joint ownership is 6.7. 
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Table 1 reports on several regressions with the associated robust standard errors that 
try to explain A’s investment behavior. The first one is a simple OLS regression of A’s 
investment on B’s investment. There is a very strong and highly significant relation between 
the two. An increase in B’s investment level by one unit increases the expected investment 
level of A by 0.89. Thus, the expected marginal return of one additional unit of investment for 
player B is  
 1 22(1 0.89) 12 8.79 0
2
+ − = > , 
so if player B maximizes his expected monetary income, it is indeed optimal to choose b=10.   
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Regression (1) ignores the fact that the observed investment levels of the A-players are 
not independent of each other because we observed each A-player several times. Therefore, in 
regression (2) we treated the observations of each individual A-player as separate clusters. 
Here the standard errors are based on the assumption that the investment levels are 
independent across different A-players but we allow for dependent observations within each 
cluster (i.e. for all observations belonging to one A-player). The assumption that investments 
are independent across A-players is reasonable because an A-player could never observe what 
other A-players did.10 The regression shows that the impact of b on a is still highly 
significant.  
 Regressions (3) and (4) include an additional variable 1 *D a⋅ , where D is a dummy 
variable with 
 
1 *
1
0 *
if b b
D
if b b
≥⎧= ⎨ <⎩  
The idea is that if B invests at least as much as A suggested ( ), then A may feel 
obliged to honor her announced investment level a*. The coefficient for D1×astar suggests 
that there is a 42 percent chance that A honors her announcement if B invested at least b*.  
*b b≥
 
Insert Table 2 here 
                                                 
10 To check the robustness of our results we also conducted Tobit regressions. All variables that are significant in 
the OLS regressions are also significant in the Tobit regression.  
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Although A-players respond, on average, quite strongly to increases in the investment 
level of player B, it is important to notice that there are big differences in individual behavior. 
A closer look at the data reveals that not all A-players reciprocated. This can be seen from 
Table 2 which shows the distribution of investment pairs . Note that 218 out of 300 
(72.7 percent) investment choices of A are on the diagonal, i.e., given b  player A has chosen 
. If we exclude the 37 cases with 
( , )a b
a b= 1a b= = , we still have 60.3 percent of reciprocal 
investment choices of A-players. Only 9 times did an A-player invest more than B, but there 
are 73 cases (24.3 percent) where a b< , and in 85 cases 1a = which is the dominant strategy 
of a self-interested player A. Thus, there is a significant minority of A-players who seem to 
behave selfishly. 
 
 
Result 2:  Under joint ownership there is, on average, strong reciprocity of A 
given B’s investment. A-players can be separated in two types: 
• Fair types choose  (at least 60 percent) a b=
• Selfish types choose a b<  (at least 20 percent) 
The majority of B-players (60 percent) trusted that A is going to reciprocate 
and chose . 10b =
 
Consider now the 170 out of 470 cases (36.2 percent) where A tried to sell her ownership 
stake to B. The first question is why these offers got rejected so often (in 52 cases, i.e. 30.6 
percent of all offers). The average price of the rejected offers was 176.9, while the average 
price of the accepted offers was just 120.8.11 If the seller accepts the offer T and invests b=10 
himself while A invest a=1 (which are the dominant strategies for self-interested players if B 
becomes the sole owner), then B’s payoff is 22(10 1) 12 10 122BM t t= + − ⋅ − = − . Thus, 
accepting a price offer that is larger than 122 pays off only if B expects A to invest 
considerably more than . Given that A sold her ownership stake this seems unlikely. In 
fact, A invested  in 85 out of the 118 cases (72 percent) where she sold her ownership 
stake successfully to B, and her average investment level in these cases was just 1.9. Virtually 
all B-players (111 out of 118) chose 
1a =
1a =
10b = .  
 
                                                 
11 In fact, a Mann-Whitney Test confirms that the differences between the accepted and rejected offers are highly 
statistically significant (p=0.0000). 
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Consider now the payoffs of the two players under the different ownership structures. 
Under joint ownership, A’s average income is 77.5, while B made on average 66.4. If A tried 
to sell her ownership stake to B, average payoffs are 67.9 and 12.8 respectively. Thus, it turns 
out that the payoff difference between A and B is fairly small (but statistically significant) 
under joint ownership, but very large if A offered her ownership stake for sale. Furthermore, 
joint ownership Pareto-dominates B-ownership. Figure 3 shows that in all periods (except for 
period 1) both players were better off with joint ownership than with B-ownership. These 
differences are also statistically significant.12  
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
  
Result 3: In JOD, joint ownership is the more efficient allocation of ownership 
rights. Both players receive a higher average payoff if A decides to stick to 
joint ownership rather than to sell her ownership rights to B. A purely self-
interested player A should opt for joint ownership.  
 
IV.B  A-Ownership Design 
We now turn to the results of the A-ownership design where A-players could choose between 
sticking to A-ownership or giving away for free half of the revenues of the project to the other 
player. We observed a total of 230 contractual choices in sessions S5 and S6.  
 
Result 4: The overwhelming majority of A-players chose to make B the joint 
owner of the project. There is no significant time trend. If anything, the share 
of joint ownership is increasing over time. 
 
In total, joint ownership was chosen in 81.3 percent of all contractual offers (187 of 230 
observations). The time path of choices is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
 
                                                 
12 A Mean-Whitney test shows that A’s payoff under joint ownership is significantly larger than B’s payoff 
under joint ownership (p=0.0003) and is also significantly larger than A’s payoff  if she tried to sell her 
ownership stake to B (p=0.0001). 
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 If there is joint ownership, the investment behavior is very similar to the investment 
behavior under joint ownership in the JOD: 135 out of 187 B-players (72.2 percent) choose 
. The majority of A-players reciprocated to B’s investment choices.   10b =
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The regressions reported in Table 3 have the same structure as the regressions of Table 1 and 
yield very similar results. On average, B invested 8.9b =  while A invested  as 
compared to and when A decided to stick to joint ownership in the JOD. This 
indicates that if A gives away half of the firm for free, this induces more reciprocal 
investments of B than if A just decides to stick to joint ownership.
6.5a =
7.7b = 6.7a =
13 The following table 
shows the distribution of investment pairs .  ( , )a b
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
117 out of 187 (63 percent) investment choices of A are on the diagonal, i.e., player A chose 
. If we exclude the 9 cases where a b= 1a b= = , we still have 57.8 percent of reciprocal 
investment choices of A-players. Only once did an A player invest more than B, but there are 
69 cases (37 percent) where we observe a b< , and in 49 of them 1a = which is the dominant 
strategy of a self-interested player A. Thus, there is a strong minority of A-players who 
behave selfishly. Nevertheless, most players B seem to have anticipated reciprocal behavior: 
135 out of 187 (72 percent) chose 10b = , while only 10 (5,3 percent) chose an investment 
level of 1 or 2.  
 
 
Result 5:  Under joint ownership there is, on average, strong reciprocity of A 
given B’s investment. A-players can be separated in two types: 
• Fair types choose  (at least 55 percent) a b=
• Selfish types choose a b<  (at least 35 percent) 
The majority of B-players (more than 70 percent) trusted that A is going to 
reciprocate and chose . 10b =
 
                                                 
13 In fact, a Mean-Whitney test shows that the distribution of b under joint ownership differs significantly in the 
AOD from the JOD (p=0.0004). 
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In 43 out of 230 cases (18,7 percent) A decided to stick to A-ownership and to hire B 
as an employee. B-players rejected the wage offers 5 times. The average wage offer was 
62.05. Under A-ownership almost all B-players chose the minimum effort level (average 
), while all A-players chose 1.26b = 10a = , which is a dominant strategy for both, self-
interested and fair-minded types of A.  
A’s average income under joint ownership is 91.4, while it is only 55.0 if she chose to 
stick to A-ownership. B’s average income under joint ownership is 62.9, while he received 
only 44.5 if A tried to hire him as an employee.14 Thus, the following result is very similar to 
Result 3 of JOD. 
 
Result 6: In AOD, joint ownership is the more efficient allocation of ownership 
rights. Both players receive a higher average payoff if A decides to give away 
half of the project to player B rather than to hire B as an employee. A purely 
self-interested player A should opt for joint ownership.  
 
While this result is again inconsistent with the self-interest model, it confirms the 
prediction of Grossman and Hart (1986) that parties will always try to achieve the 
most efficient ownership structure. Our results show that independent of whether the 
parties start from joint ownership or from A-ownership, they will always end up with 
joint ownership which turns out to be the most efficient ownership structure. 
 
IV.C Control Treatment for Joint Ownership Design (JOD’) 
In Session S7 and S8 we conducted a control treatment of the Joint Ownership Design in 
which the parties also started from joint ownership, but this time the game did not end after B 
rejected A’s offer. Instead the game continued with joint ownership as if no offer had been 
made. We have a total of 240 observations for this treatment. Again, joint ownership 
prevailed in the majority of cases (196 of 240 observations, 81.7 percent). However, this time 
A-players tried to sell their ownership stake more often (in 134 out of 240 cases, 55.8 
percent). It seems that making an offer was considered to be less risky by A-players because if 
the offer got rejected the parties would just get back to the status quo of joint ownership. In 
                                                 
14 Even if we only consider those cases where B accepted A’s wage offer, both parties receive a lower payoff 
than under joint ownership (A: 62.2, B: 50.4).  
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fact, the offers got rejected considerably more often (in 90 out of 134 cases, 67.2 percent).  
Let us consider the three different possibilities in turn: 
• If A did not make an offer, the investment behavior is very similar to the investment 
behavior in the other designs when joint ownership prevailed. B-players invested on 
average , while A-players invested on average 7.0b = 6.1a = . The reciprocal behavior 
of A-players is virtually identical to the one that we observed under joint ownership in 
JOD and AOD. 
• If A did make an offer that was accepted by B-players, the investment behavior is very 
similar to the corresponding case in the JOD. Almost all B-players invested efficiently 
(  on average), while almost all A-players chose the minimum investment level 
(  on average). However, it is interesting to note that the average price of the 
accepted offers was much lower than the average accepted price in the JOD (
9.5b =
1.2a =
88.9T =  
as compared to ). This reflects the fact that B’s threat point payoff if he 
rejected the offer was not zero but to go back to the status quo of joint ownership. In 
fact, B’s average payoff after accepting A’s offer is 31.4 which is significantly larger 
than the 18.5 that he received on average when he accepted A’s offer in the original 
JOD.  
120.8T =
• Two thirds of all offers made by A-players got rejected. The average price of the 
rejected offers was 161.4, again somewhat lower than the average price of rejected 
offers in the original JOD (176.9), but still very high. After the offer was rejected the 
two players played the investment game under joint ownership. In these cases B 
invested only  while A invested only  on average which seems to be much 
less than the investment levels under joint ownership in JOD or AOD. The following 
regression confirms that there is a significant difference in A’s investment behavior 
depending on whether she initially tried to sell her ownership stake (and got rejected) 
or not. Here, D2 is a dummy variable that is equal to 0 if joint ownership prevailed 
because A’s offer to sell was rejected and equal to 1 if A decided to stick to joint 
ownership voluntarily. The regression shows that if A’s sales offer got rejected, she 
reciprocates significantly less.  
6.3b = 3.9
 
Insert Table 5 here 
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This is also reflected by the fact that the fraction of A-players who chose 1a =  
independently of the investment level of player B is much larger if A’s offer got 
rejected: 54 out of 90 A-players (60 percent) chose the minimum investment level. B-
players seem to have anticipated this behavior, and only 40 out of 90 (44.4 percent) 
opted for the efficient investment level 10b = .15 Thus, the fact that A-players tried to 
sell their ownership stake to B was interpreted by B-players as a signal that it is less 
likely that they face a fair-minded A-player, and this expectation turned out to be 
correct.  
 
V   Theoretical Predictions  
 
The predictions of the property rights approach and the self-interest model can be summarized 
as follows: 
Proposition 1: If both parties are only interested in maximizing their own 
material payoff, then  
1. A and B-ownership are equally efficient and more efficient than joint 
ownership and 
2. no matter what the initial allocation of ownership rights, the parties will 
trade ownership rights ex ante so as to set up the efficient ownership 
structure and to implement the second best optimal investment decisions.  
 
The first prediction is clearly refuted by the experimental results which have shown that joint 
ownership is far more efficient than A- or B-ownership in all three treatments. However, the 
second prediction is largely confirmed by the experiments.  In the large majority of all cases 
parties agreed on the more efficient joint ownership arrangement ex ante, no matter whether 
they started from A-ownership or from joint ownership.  
In this section we want to discuss whether theories of fairness and reciprocity are 
consistent with the experimental results. There are several recent theories that try to capture 
concerns for fairness and/or reciprocity on individual decision making. Some of the proposed 
models, in particular Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), adopt the 
concept of “psychological game theory” that had been introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce and 
                                                 
15 A Mean-Whitney test confirms that the distribution of b under joint ownership is significantly different if A 
chose joint ownership as compared to if B rejected A’s offer (p=0.0000).  
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Stacchetti (1989) in order to model “intention-based reciprocity”. In these models players 
have beliefs not just about the actions of their opponents but also about their intentions. They 
are willing to reward kind and to punish unkind intentions. While these models convey many 
interesting insights, they are complicated and often difficult to use in applications. 
Furthermore, they are often plagued by multiple equilibria. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) follow a different approach. They assume that players care only 
about outcomes (and not about intentions), but that they have “social preferences” in the sense 
that they dislike inequitable allocations. These models do not capture “reciprocity” in the 
intension-based sense, but rather “distributional fairness” or “inequity aversion”. These 
models use standard game theoretic tools and it is straightforward to apply them to any game. 
Furthermore, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) show that their 
models are able to explain not just the qualitative, but also the quantitative results of many 
classes of experimental games fairly well.16  
It turns out that models of intensions-based reciprocity give rise to the same 
predictions as models of social preferences if it is assumed that everybody is strongly 
concerned about fairness. However, the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model acknowledges that 
people differ and that only some people care about fairness while others behave rather 
selfishly. Furthermore, the model allows for incomplete information about which type of 
player the opponent is. With heterogeneous agents the interaction between fair and self-
interested types comes into play and gives rise to quite different predictions. In the rest of this 
section we will analyze these two cases in more detail. 
  
V.A  Homogeneous  fair agents  
Consider first the case where all parties strongly care about fairness and/or reciprocity. In this 
case models of intention-based reciprocity and of models of inequity aversion yield the same 
predictions in the context of the simple game under consideration here.  
To see this consider the case of joint ownership first. If players are concerned about 
intentions, then a low investment level of player B will be interpreted as a hostile action that 
A wants to punish by choosing a low investment level herself, while a high level of b will be 
interpreted as a kind action that is rewarded by a high level of a. Anticipating this, player B 
                                                 
16 There are also a few models that try to model preferences for fair outcomes and fair intentions simultaneously, 
in particular Falk and Fischbacher  (2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002). These models are more general, 
because they combine social preferences and intention based reciprocity, but they are even less tractable for 
applications and again plagued by multiple equilibria. See Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for 
extensive surveys and critical discussions of this literature.  
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will choose the efficient investment level b* at stage 1, and A will reciprocate by choosing 
. If players are inequity averse, then player A will also match B’s investment level and 
choose a(b)=b, not because she cares about intentions, but because this equalizes final 
payoffs. Anticipating this, player B will again invest efficiently at stage 1. Thus both 
approaches imply that joint ownership implements first best investments. 
*a a=
What about A-ownership? At stage 2, A’s investment decision does not affect B’s 
payoff, because B gets a fixed wage anyway. Therefore, models of intention based reciprocity 
predict that A will just maximize her own payoff, i.e. choose the efficient investment level 
a=10. If player A has social preferences and dislikes inequality, she will also invest 
efficiently. To see this, we have to distinguish two cases depending on the fixed wage w that 
B receives. Either w is sufficiently large so that B is better off than A. In this case A wants to 
reduce the payoff difference by maximizing her own monetary payoff which requires that she 
invests efficiently. Or w is such that A is better off than B. In this case A may want to reduce 
the payoff difference by investing *( )a a b< . However, if we assume with Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) that A prefers to get one additional Dollar for herself rather than to throw this Dollar 
away in order to reduce the inequality towards B17, she will invest efficiently.   
At stage 1, B’s investment b depends on the wage that A offered to him at stage 0. If w 
is small, B will choose a low investment level. In a model of intension based reciprocity he 
will do so in order to punish A for her unkind offer. In a model of inequity aversion he will 
choose a low investment level in order to reduce the payoff difference between himself and A. 
On the other hand, if A offered a generous wage at date 0 that gives  to B, 
then B will choose the efficient investment level b*, either because he wants to reward A for 
her generous offer or because he wants to increase A’s payoff in order to reduce the inequality 
that is now to his advantage. Thus, at stage 0, a fair player A will make this generous wage 
offer that equalizes payoffs, and both parties will choose the efficient investment levels a* 
and b*, respectively.
1/ 2 ( *, *)w v a b= ⋅
18 The analysis of B-ownership is analogous to the case of A-ownership.  
 
Proposition 2: If both parties are strongly concerned about either 
distributional fairness or intention-based reciprocity, then the ownership 
                                                 
17 I.e., 1β < . See Section III.C below. 
18 It has to be noted that this equilibrium is unique if players have social preferences, but that there are other 
equilibria if players care about the intentions of their opponents. For example, it is also an equilibrium that A 
offers a low wage because she beliefs that player B will be hostile and choose a low investment level. In 
equilibrium these beliefs are self-fulfilling.  
 18
  
structure is irrelevant. Both parties will invest efficiently no matter whether 
there is joint, A-, or B-ownership.  
 
Thus, if fairness and reciprocity are common knowledge, then they induce both parties to 
invest efficiently even if investments cannot be contracted upon. Reciprocal fairness suffices 
as an enforcement device, and the allocation of ownership rights does not play a role. 
However, like the self-interest model, this prediction is in stark contrast to the experimental 
evidence.   
 
V.B  Interaction of self-interested and fair players  
We will now consider the case where some people are strongly concerned about fairness 
while other people are mainly self-interested. Furthermore, we will assume that people don’t 
know whether they face a fair and trustworthy opponent or whether their opponent is going to 
exploit them. This case of heterogeneous agents and incomplete information is considerably 
more difficult to analyze with models of intention based reciprocity. However, the Fehr-
Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion takes the distribution of preferences and 
incomplete information explicitly into account and allows to analyze the game with 
incomplete information in a fairly straightforward manner. Therefore, in the following we will 
focus on the model of inequity aversion. However, we would like to stress that we do not 
regard our experiments as a test of this particular model against other models of fairness. 
The theory of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has two main ingredients: First, it assumes that 
some people are not only concerned about their own material payoff but also care about 
inequity or, in our context, inequality.19 Second, the theory acknowledges that people differ. 
Some people are very much concerned about inequality and have a high willingness to pay in 
order to reduce it, while others only care about their own material payoff. In the two-player 
case the utility function of inequity averse (fair) players is given by 
 { } { }( ) max ,0 max ,0 ,i i i j i i i jU x x x x x xα β= − ⋅ − − ⋅ −  
{ }1,2i∈ , , where i ≠ j 1 2( , )x x x=  denotes the vector of monetary payoffs, i iβ α≤  and 
0 i 1β≤ < . In this utility function, the term weighted with iα  measures the utility loss that 
                                                 
19Fairness implies that equals should be treated equally. In our experiments, the subjects enter the laboratory as 
equals. They have no information about their opponents and do not know with whom they trade. Thus, in these 
very simple environments, it seems natural to define equality as the reference point for a fair payoff distribution. 
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stems from inequality to i ’s disadvantage, while the term weighted with iβ  measures the loss 
from advantageous inequality.  
We use a simplified version of this theory. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we 
assume that there are 60 percent self-interested types ( 0i iα β= = ) and 40 percent “fair” 
types. We assume that fair subjects exhibit 2iα =  and 0.5 1iβ< < . Thus, if the inequality is 
to their disadvantage, they are prepared to engage in costly “punishment” in order to reduce 
the payoff of their opponent. On the other hand, if the inequality is to their advantage, they are 
willing to spend resources in order to benefit the other player. Note that subjects with 
1 0i .5β≥ >  and 2iα =  and are willing to share the surplus of a contract equally but also to 
reject offers that give them less than 25 percent of the surplus. Fehr and Schmidt 
demonstrated that the evidence from many experiments is roughly compatible with the 
assumption that 40 percent of all subjects fall in this category. 20   
On the basis of these assumptions, the property rights game can be analyzed using 
standard game theoretic tools. The full analysis is not difficult but somewhat lengthy and is 
therefore relegated to an appendix that can be found on our webpage.21 In the following, we 
report the main predictions for our experiments and give the intuition for them. 
 
V.B.1  Analysis of the Joint Ownership Design 
With asymmetric information about whether the opponent is self-interested or fair-minded, 
the contract offer made at stage 0 may signal some information about A’s type. Therefore, let 
p denote the (endogenously determined) probability assigned by B to the event that he faces 
the self-interested type of player A.  
Consider first the case where A chooses to stick to joint ownership at date 0. At date 2, 
a self-interested type of A chooses a=1 while a fair-minded type of A chooses a=b.  At date 
1, anticipating A's reaction, the self-interested type of B chooses b=10 if he believes that it is 
sufficiently likely that he faces a fair-minded player A, i.e. if p is sufficiently small 
( 10 0.91
11
p < = ). Otherwise he chooses b=1. The fair-minded type of B, on the other hand, 
                                                 
20 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for a more extensive discussion of the experimental evidence on the distribution 
of inequity averse types. When they calibrated their model to explain the quantitative evidence in the different 
games they used four different types, but aggregated they also have that 40 percent of subjects exhibit 
0.5i iα β≥ > and that 60 percent exhibit 0.5 .i iα β> ≥  
21 Please visit: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/property_rights/index.htm  . 
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will be more careful, because he suffers not only the monetary loss if player A does not 
reciprocate, he also suffers from the inequity that is generated if he invests while A does not. 
Therefore, the fair-minded type of B will invest only if 10 0.29
35
p < = . This result is 
surprising. It says that if there is uncertainty about A’s type, then a self-interested player B is 
more likely to invest than the fair-minded type of B.  
Consider now the case where A sold his ownership stake to B at price t, so B is the 
sole owner of the project and full residual claimant on profits. In this case it is a dominant 
strategy for both types of B to choose 10b =  at date 1. The intuition is simply that with B-
ownership B’s investment does not affect A’s payoff, so B cannot increase A’s payoff by 
investing less than the efficient amount. At stage 2, the self-interest type of A chooses again 
a=1. The fair-minded type of A will invest in order to reduce the inequality between herself 
and B, but only if she sold her ownership stake at a sufficiently high price to B. In fact, she 
chooses the efficient investment level if and only if .  220t ≥
We now turn to the analysis of the entire game. First, we can rule out the possibility of 
a separating equilibrium in which the self-interested type of A chooses one type of contract 
with probability 1 and the fair-minded type of A chooses another type.  
 
Lemma 1: There does not exist a separating equilibrium. 
 
The intuition is that the selfish type of A would always want to mimic the fair type: Suppose 
that the selfish type of A sells her ownership stake while the fair type chooses to stick to joint 
ownership. Then B would invest 10 under joint ownership which induces the selfish type of A 
to deviate and to stick to joint ownership as well. So suppose that the selfish type of A sticks 
to joint ownership while the fair-minded type offers to sell. In this case B would choose b=1 if 
he is offered joint ownership, so the selfish type of A is better off by selling his ownership 
share, a contradiction.  
In the game under consideration here it seems very plausible that sticking to joint 
ownership will not be interpreted as a signal that player A is selfish. This is captured by the 
following condition:  
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Condition 1: If A chooses to stick to joint ownership, then B’s updated belief 
that he faces the self-interested type of A does not increase. 
 
This condition implies that the game has a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 3 [Joint Ownership Design]: With incomplete information about 
the players’ types there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome 
satisfying Condition 1. The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both 
types of A stick to joint ownership. 
• The self-interested type of B chooses 10sb = , while the fair-minded 
type of B chooses 1fb = . The self-interested type of A chooses 
and the fair-minded type of A chooses 1sa = fa b=  in equilibrium. 
• Expected monetary payoffs are  for the self-interested type 
of A and  for the fair-minded type of A, so the average 
monetary payoff of A is . The expected monetary payoff of 
the self-interested type of B is  and of the fair-minded type 
of B is , so in expectation . 
69.4AsM =
64AfM =
67.24AM =
40.6BsM =
10BfM = 28.36BM =
 
Note that Proposition 3 differs sharply from Propositions 1 and 2. Proposition 1 
assumed that it is common knowledge that all players are self-interested. In this case no 
ownership structure implements first-best investments, but A- and B-ownership are strictly 
better than joint ownership. Proposition 2 assumed that all players are fair-minded. In this 
case any allocation of ownership rights implements first-best investment decisions and the 
allocation of ownership rights is indeterminate. With incomplete information about the 
players’ types, Proposition 3 shows, like Proposition 1, that first-best investments cannot be 
implemented, but that there is a second-best allocation of ownership rights that will obtain in 
equilibrium. However, this time joint ownership is optimal. Proposition 3 predicts that in 
equilibrium player B invests efficiently only if he is self-interested. If he is fair-minded, he 
prefers not to invest in order to reduce the inequality that arises if he is matched with a selfish  
player A. Player A invests efficiently only if she is fair-minded and if she is matched with a 
B-player who invested .  10b =
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In the control treatment JOD’ the game did not end when A offered to sell her share 
and B rejected this offer. Instead, the game continued with joint ownership. This improves B’s 
threatpoint payoff when A chooses to make an offer which makes it less attractive for A to 
sell her share to B. On the other hand, it is less risky for A to make an offer, because if her 
offer gets rejected, the parties are just back to joint ownership. Nevertheless, it is shown in the 
Appendix that Proposition 3 still applies on the equilibrium path, so the prediction for this 
control experiment is exactly the same.  
 
V.B.2  Analysis of the A-Ownership Design 
In this design A is the sole owner of the project initially. At date 0 she can choose whether to 
remain the sole owner and to hire B as an employee at wage , or whether to give away half 
of the project to B for free in which case there is joint ownership.  
w
If A goes for joint ownership, the analysis is the same as the one of the last subsection. So 
suppose that she decides to stick to A-ownership and to hire B as an employee. As in the case 
of B-ownership above, at stage 2, it is a dominant strategy for the self-interested and the fair-
minded owner to choose a=10. Consider now stage 1. Anticipating A's investment, the self-
interested type of B clearly chooses b=1. The fair-minded type of B also chooses b=1 if his 
wage is sufficiently small (w<67). Otherwise he will choose b so as to equalize payoffs. This 
parallels the analysis of B-ownership in Section V.B.1 above. 
Consider now stage 0. The self-interested type of B will accept the contract offered by 
A if and only if . The fair-minded type of B accepts any contract with . At stage 
0, if the self-interested type of A offers 
12w ≥ 56w ≥
12w = , this will only be accepted by the self-
interested type of B. If she offers 56w =  this will be accepted by both types of B, which 
yields a slightly higher payoff. It is easy to show that offering more than 56 reduces her 
payoff, so A will offer which is accepted by both types of B.  The fair-minded type of 
A wants to equalize payoffs and offers 
56w =
67w = , which is also accepted by both types of B. 
Hence, the theory of inequity aversion predicts the same investment levels as the self-interest 
theory, but it differs in the prediction of the wages offered to B. 
Let us now turn to the entire game. Again, if we are willing to impose a condition that 
parallels Condition 1, we get a unique equilibrium prediction. 
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Condition 1’: If A offers a joint ownership contract and gives away half of the 
revenues of the firm to B, then B’s updated belief that he faces the self-
interested type of A does not increase. 
 
Proposition 4 [A-Ownership Design]: With incomplete information about the 
players types there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome 
satisfying Condition 1’. The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both 
types of A offer a joint ownership contract which is accepted by both types of 
B. The equilibrium outcome is the same as under joint ownership described in 
Proposition 3. 
 
Thus, Propositions 3 and 4 predict that the players will always end up with joint 
ownership, no matter what the initial allocation of ownership rights. Joint ownership 
does not implement first best investment decisions. However, it still outperforms A- 
(or B-ownership). Under joint ownership both parties invest with a significant 
probability, while under A- (or B-)ownership only the owner invests while the other 
party does not. Furthermore, under A-ownership A has to hire B as an employee, and 
there is a significant probability that a fair-minded type of B will reject a wage offer 
that he perceives as unfair. Similarly, in the joint ownership design A has to sell her 
ownership stake to B and again there is some probability that this offer is going to be 
rejected. Therefore, the model of inequity aversion predicts that joint ownership is 
more efficient. This is in contrast to the self-interest model that predicts A-(or B-) 
ownership to be more efficient. However, both models support the Coase Theorem 
which suggests that the parties will adopt the ownership structure that is most efficient 
independent of the initial allocation of ownership rights.  
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed the problem of the optimal allocation of ownership rights under 
three different assumptions about people’s preferences. First, the standard property rights 
approach assumes that all people are purely self-interested. In such a world, no ownership 
structure induces the parties to make efficient relationship specific investments. However, the 
allocation of ownership rights matters, because A- and B-ownership strongly outperform joint 
 24
  
ownership. Second, if all people are strongly concerned about fairness or reciprocity, then 
under any ownership structure reciprocal fairness suffices as an enforcement device to induce 
all parties to invest efficiently. Thus, the allocation of ownership rights is irrelevant. Third, 
the model of inequity aversion assumes that some people are strongly fair-minded while 
others are mainly self-interested. This model focuses on the interaction between fair-minded 
and self-interested players and shows that fairness alone is not sufficient to induce first best 
investments and that the ownership structure does matter. However, in contrast to the property 
rights approach, it is joint ownership that turns out to be second-best optimal. The reason is 
that joint ownership makes better (but still imperfect) use of fairness as an implicit 
enforcement device.  
The experimental results are largely consistent with the model of inequity aversion. 
People differ in their behavior. Joint ownership turns out to induce higher investment levels 
than A- (or B-) ownership and to generate higher payoffs for both parties. Furthermore, the 
experimental subjects seemed to understand this. They opted predominantly for joint 
ownership, independent of the initial ownership structure. This confirms the proposition of the 
Coase Theorem that the parties will always try to choose the efficient ownership structure ex 
ante.  
In a recent paper, Oliver Hart (2001) argues that (a) “although norms are undoubtedly 
very important both inside and between firms, incorporating them into the theory has been 
very difficult and is likely to continue to be so in the near future” and (b) “a norm-free theory 
of  the firm and a norm-rich theory of the firm don’t seem to have very different predictions”. 
He mainly looked at models of repeated games that try to capture norms or reciprocal 
behavior. In this paper we have shown that the recent advances in modeling fairness and 
reciprocity in one-shot games provide powerful tools to incorporate norms of fair or 
reciprocal behavior into contract theory. This allows us to derive important and testable 
predictions on the optimal allocation of ownership rights, some of which differ significantly 
from the standard predictions of the self-interest model. If we want to understand the 
incentive properties of real institutions on real people, concerns for fairness and reciprocity 
have to be taken into account.  
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Figure 1: Share of joint ownership and B-ownership over time in the JOD 
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Figure 2: A’s average investment given b under joint ownership (JOD) 
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Figure 3: Payoffs over time under joint ownership and B-ownership (JOD) 
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Figure 4: Share of joint ownership and A-ownership over time in the AOD 
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Table 1: Player A’s investment as a function of player B’s investment 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
A’s investment a 
(1) 
(robust 
standard 
errors) 
(2) 
(robust 
standard 
errors & 
clusters) 
(1) 
(robust 
standard 
errors) 
(2) 
(robust 
standard 
errors & 
clusters) 
 
Const 
-0.11 
(0.38) 
-011 
(0.83) 
1.14*** 
(0.43) 
1.14 
(0.82) 
    
B 
0.89*** 
(0.04) 
0.89*** 
(0.09) 
0.38*** 
(0.11) 
0.38*** 
(0.14) 
     
D1×astar 
  0.42*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
     
No. of 
observations 
300 300 300 300 
    
Adjusted R2
0.57 0.57 0.62 0.62 
Table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2: Investments (b,a) with joint ownership contracts in JOD 
 
               
 b/ a  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Σ   
               
 1  37     1    3 41  
 2  5 3        1 9  
 3  2 1 1        4  
 4  3 1  1    1   6  
 5  10 1  2 4      17  
 6  7 1    3 1    12  
 7  3    1 3 5   1 13  
 8  4     1 1 1  1 8  
 9  3      1  6  10  
 10  11 1   3 3 1 2 2 157 180  
 Σ   85 8 1 3 8 11 9 4 8 163 300  
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Table 3: Player A’s investment as a function of B’s investment (AOD) 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
A’s investment a 
(1) 
(robust 
standard 
errors) 
(2) 
(robust 
standard 
errors & 
clusters) 
(1) 
(robust 
standard 
errors) 
(2) 
(robust 
standard 
errors & 
clusters) 
 
Const 
-0.70 
(0.51) 
-0.70 
(0.54) 
0.32 
(0.46) 
0.32 
() 
    
b 
0.81*** 
(0.07) 
0.81*** 
(0.10) 
0.52*** 
(0.12) 
0.52*** 
(0.12) 
     
D1×astar 
  0.21** 
(0.10) 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
     
No. of 
observations 
187 187 187 187 
    
R-squared 
0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
Table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4: Investments (b,a) with joint ownership contracts in AOD 
 
 
                   
  b / a  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Σ   
       
  1  9          9   
  2  1          1   
  3            0   
  4     1       1   
  5  3 1  1 2      7   
  6  2     1    1 4   
  7  5 1 1    3    10   
  8  2   1 1 1  4   9   
  9  3      1 2 5  11   
  10 33 2   2  1 1 4 92 135   
 Σ  58 4 1 3 5 2 5 7 9 93 187  
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Table 5: Player A’s investment as a function of  B’s investment (JOD’) 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
A’s investment a 
(1) 
(robust 
standard 
errors) 
(2) 
(robust 
standard 
errors & 
clusters) 
(3) 
(robust 
standard 
errors) 
(4) 
(robust 
standard 
errors & 
clusters) 
 
Const 
0.16 
(0.17) 
0.16 
() 
0.20 
(0.17) 
0.20 
() 
    
b 
0.74*** 
(0.05) 
0.74*** 
(0.08) 
0.58*** 
(0.07) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
     
 
D2 × b 
  0.27*** 
(0.07) 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
     
No. of 
observations 
196 196 196 196 
    
R-squared 
0.47 0.47 0.53 0.53 
Table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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